







































Jacint Balaguer WP-EC 2009-16
The market integration process under 
different regulatory regimes: 




Los documentos de trabajo del Ivie ofrecen un avance de los resultados de las 
investigaciones económicas en curso, con objeto de generar un proceso de 
discusión previo a su remisión a las revistas científicas. Al publicar este 
documento de trabajo, el Ivie no asume responsabilidad sobre su contenido.  
 
Ivie working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way 
in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific 
journals for their final publication. Ivie’s decision to publish this working paper 
does not imply any responsibility for its content. 
 
 
La Serie EC, coordinada por Matilde Mas, está orientada a la aplicación de 
distintos instrumentos de análisis al estudio de problemas económicos 
concretos. 
 
Coordinated by Matilde Mas, the EC Series mainly includes applications of 
different analytical tools to the study of specific economic problems. 
 
 
Todos los documentos de trabajo están disponibles de forma gratuita en la web 
del Ivie http://www.ivie.es, así como las instrucciones para los autores que 
desean publicar en nuestras series. 
 
Working papers can be downloaded free of charge from the Ivie website 
http://www.ivie.es, as well as the instructions for authors who are interested in 










Edita / Published by: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
 
Depósito Legal / Legal Deposit no.: V-284-2010 
 
Impreso en España (enero 2010) / Printed in Spain (January 2010) WP-EC 2009-16 
 
The market integration process 
 under different regulatory regimes: 








In this paper we investigate the European car market integration process by analyzing the 
evolution of cross-country differences in the degree of Pricing-to-Market. The study takes into 
account the pricing behavior of United Kingdom exporters from 1999m1 to 2009m1. Our 
preliminary results indicate that international price discrimination is a source of price dispersion 
within the euro area, and this implies the presence of market segmentation and significant 
divergences in the market structures perceived by exporter firms. Nevertheless, a dynamic analysis 
shows that differences in cross-country Pricing-to-Market are significantly unstable and support 
variations in market structures perceived by exporters. When we include data generated since the 
Block Exemption Regulation (1400/2002) came fully into force, results support convergence in 
cross-country pricing behavior. This outcome clearly contrasts with the evidence obtained for 
some control products and the previous period. These findings are consistent with the fact that 
the corresponding liberalization of the car distribution system has played an important role in 
progressing toward market integration. 
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Resumen 
En este trabajo investigamos el proceso de integración del mercado europeo de automóviles 
analizando la evolución en las divergencias del “Pricing-to-Market” a través de distintos países de 
destino de las exportaciones. El estudio toma en consideración el comportamiento de precios de 
los exportares de Reino Unido durante el período 1999m1-2009m1. Los resultados preliminares 
indican la presencia de discriminación internacional de precios como fuente de dispersión de 
precios en el área euro, lo que implica la presencia de segmentación de mercados y divergencias 
significativas en las estructuras de mercado percibidas por las empresas exportadoras. No 
obstante, el análisis dinámico muestra que las divergencias en el “Pricing-to-Market” son 
inestables lo que implica variaciones relativas en las estructuras de mercado percibidas por los 
exportadores. Cuando en el análisis incluimos información estadística a partir de la implantación 
completa de las Exenciones en Bloque (1400/2002), obtenemos convergencia en el 
comportamiento de precios a través de los países. Este resultado contrasta claramente con la 
evidencia obtenida a partir de algunos productos de control y el período anterior. Los resultados 
son consistentes con que la liberalización del sistema de distribución haya jugado un papel 
relevante en el proceso de integración del mercado. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Palabras clave: “Pricing-to-Market”, integración de mercado, exportadores de automóviles, 
cláusulas de localización. 
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** J. Balaguer: University Jaume I. E-mail: coll@eco.uji.es1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades the European Commission has implemented a great 
body of regulatory legislation with the aim of facilitating market access for goods and 
promoting further market integration. This has been especially relevant in certain 
sectors on account of their economic importance and large repercussion on consumers. 
The motor vehicle sector is the one that has received the most attention, and even more 
so since the elimination of checks at internal borders in January 1993. Since then, the 
market has been monitored to check for differences in automobile prices across 
European Union (EU) countries.
1 The monitoring reports have revealed information 
that is useful to detect certain difficulties in car distribution and to propose corrective 
actions. The first group of reports shows that, in general, price dispersion (net of tax) 
has gradually been reduced. However, this global trend toward a reduction in price 
differentials disappeared around 1999. This was a worrying phenomenon because at that 
time price divergences on new cars continued to be substantially high even within the 
euro area.  
In view of this situation, the European Commission sent different questionnaires 
out to interested parties (i.e. car manufacturers, associations of consumers and dealers) 
and commissioned several descriptive studies from external consultants.
2 The answers 
and documents thus obtained helped to reveal a series of shortcomings that hinder the 
internal market. An evaluation report was then published in November 2000 which 
pointed out that the main problems probably arose from the specific regulatory regime 
in the automotive sector. It was indicated that competition between distributors was not 
strong enough and that they remained too dependent on the control by producers. More 
specifically, the Commission’s evaluation report identified the well-known “location 
clause” included in contracts between car makers and dealers as the main obstacle 
hindering competition among distributors. The clause prevented dealers from taking 
advantage of business opportunities by opening up outlets in EU countries where prices 
are higher. In order to accomplish more competition so that automobile consumers 
could benefit from the European Single Market Program, an in-depth reform of the 
approach to automotive sales was undertaken with the adoption of the Block Exemption 
Regulation (BER) 1400/2002. The change in the legal framework became fully 
operative in October 2005 with the abolition of “location clauses”. The elimination of 
                                                 
1 These took the form of bi-annual reports until May 2007, and from then on they have been published 
once a year.  
 
2 External studies and price reports are on the Commission’s website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/motor_vehicles/overview_en.html. 
  4this “real barrier” possibly eased the way for the appearance of a process of reduction in 
market segmentation and greater similarity in the market structures across countries.  
The cross-border integration of markets has attracted a great deal of attention not 
only from policy-makers, but also from academic economists. An increasing interest in 
researching this issue has arisen since the adoption of the euro in the eleven founding 
member states of the European Monetary Union in 1999. The key question is whether 
this “natural experiment” leads to further market integration for goods. In general, the 
hypothesis is based on the idea that the introduction of the euro implies greater price 
transparency within the region, which is in turn associated with lower arbitrage costs.
3 
However, there is no substantial evidence to support this hypothesis. This is at least the 
case of the automobile sector, where data collected until the early 2000s has been used.
Some representative works provide a complete empirical analysis of this 
question. On the one hand, Engel and Rogers (2004) considered  a great variety of 
detailed products in several European cities (from 1990 to 2003) and obtained robust 
evidence in favor of a continuous reduction in consumer price dispersion throughout 
most of the 90s. This outcome contrasts with the results for the period after January 
1999. Even after controlling for an important number of factors (those that might affect 
price deviations across European cities), the authors found that the introduction of the 
euro did not seem to matter. In this paper, as a possible explanation, it is suggested that 
the expected effect has still not been captured because research had to be carried out on 
a very small time window. A second possible answer that would make the results 
understandable is that most markets for consumer products were already highly 
integrated when the euro was introduced. Nevertheless, as the authors indicated, even 
under this assumption the car sector would be a clear exception in line with the paper by 
Goldberg and Verboven (2004). On the other hand, then, Goldberg and Verboven’s 
paper carries out an in-depth analysis of the possible convergence of car price 
dispersion in EU countries (from 1993 to 2003). It reveals that, at the beginning of the 
2000s, cross-country price differences remained large and the introduction of the euro 
played a smaller role in price dispersion. Hence, price-setting for cars still depended 
significantly on each local structure rather than on overall market structure. These 
results are interpreted as a high degree of segmentation of the European car markets, 
which is in turn mainly attributed to legal obstacles hindering cross-border trade and the 
location of retail selling firms. As in Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and Goldberg and 
                                                 
3 Another mechanism that can promote it has also been investigated. Thus, the theoretical paper by 
Friberg (2003) indicates that alternative mechanisms, such as lower incentives for endogenous 
segmentation of markets, may have a bigger impact.  
  5Verboven (2005), the authors claimed that the European Commission’s specific efforts 
to increase integration within the car market are necessary. Together with the 
expediency of a policy for tax harmonization, the liberalization of the distribution 
system in the sector is also pointed to as being essential to improve market integration. 
In this paper we are interested in complementing the existing  literature by 
investigating whether the integration of European car markets is increasing after the full 
application of the new rules for distribution introduced by the BER (1400/2002). To this 
end, we considered the prices of cars related to a group of euro area member countries 
from January 1999 to January 2009. This will allow us to compare the sub-period in 
which the euro was introduced with the sub-period where, additionally, specific sectoral 
measures designed to increase competition were fully adopted. Taking into account the 
behavior of United Kingdom (UK) exporters, we will base the operational definition of 
market integration for goods on the degree of Pricing-to-Market (PTM).
4  
An important number of empirical studies have focused on the phenomenon of 
PTM behavior since Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987) established the initial 
theoretical background. This phenomenon has helped to explain the incomplete 
fulfillment of Exchange Rate Pass-Through. Moreover, since PTM behavior is based on 
multiple transactions, it provides an alternative with which to test the relative version of 
Law of One Price (LOOP) in a cross-border framework. Evidence against an integrated 
region is obtained when markup adjustments induced by exchange rate variations differ 
across the export destination countries (and, consequently, the relative price in 
common-currency terms for a product varies over time). In practice, as determined with 
the typical test for LOOP, one remarkable advantage of PTM analysis is that it directly 
prevents the problems associated with comparisons of prices of goods produced and 
sold in different locations. This is because it involves the use of free on board (fob) 
prices which thus exclude differences in transportation costs, tariffs, local taxes and 
other distribution costs. Analyses based on PTM can therefore be a very suitable 
procedure when, as in this paper, we are interested in knowing the importance of cross-
border segmentation.
5
                                                 
4 The phenomenon of PTM behavior refers to specific markup adjustments in response to variations in 
exchange rate against the destination markets. The policy acts as active international price discrimination 
across different destination markets.  
5  The importance of the border effect on prices of goods is widely recognized in the international 
economics literature. Hence, for example, the influential paper by Engel and Rogers (1996) shows us in 
an intuitive way that, for a particular distance between two cities, divergences in consumer prices are 
much higher if the two cities belong to different countries. 
  6As can be seen in the survey conducted by Golberg and Knetter (1997), an 
influential model for measuring the degree of PTM behavior was proposed by Knetter 
(1989). From the tradition of new industrial economics, where marginal costs are 
considered to be non-observable (Bresnahan, 1989), it represented a great advance in 
the empirical research on this phenomenon. With the intention of estimating PTM on 
levels and avoiding marginal cost information, the proposed regression model exploits 
the idiosyncratic variations in exchange rates across the export destination countries. As 
a way to analyze an alternative context where countries share a common currency (like 
the euro area) the short paper by Balaguer (2007) studies differences in PTM behavior 
across the export destination countries. In this framework, where there are no 
idiosyncratic variations in exchange rates, the induced markup adjustments across 
destination countries only arise from perceived divergences in market structures. The 
presence of cross-country PTM differences should therefore be interpreted as market 
segmentation and deviations in market structures, while the same degree of cross-
country PTM behavior should be interpreted as being in favor of integration of markets. 
To obtain a picture of the evolution of the market integration process, in this 
paper we will focus on the dynamics of cross-country PTM differences. Thus, variations 
in these differences over time can be attributed to changes in market structures (in 
relative terms). Although a great number of empirical papers based on PTM behavior 
have appeared in the literature, to our knowledge this is the first time that their dynamic 
evolution has been used to obtain a continuous picture of the market integration process. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present some basic aspects 
of changes in the car distribution system in the EU. The econometric approach used is 
provided in section 3. In section 4 we describe the dataset. In section 5 we can see the 
empirical results. We start by presenting estimations of cross-country PTM deviations 
and the results of tests for constancy of coefficients over time from the modern 
methodology proposed by Elliott and Müller (2006). The results of the tests indicate 
that these deviations are clearly unstable. Since these preliminary findings are 
compatible with a process of market integration, we will carry out a deeper study based 
on the results of moving window regressions. A set of estimations about cross-country 
PTM differences will be useful to illustrate the evolution of market integration. A 
formal analysis of σ−convergence carried out later will allow us to infer whether 
markets have become more integrated after completing the reform of the car distribution 
system. The final section of this paper provides the summary conclusions. 
 
  72.  An overview of the main regulation changes 
Based on the idea that certain forms of vertical agreements between car 
manufacturers and dealers imply an improvement in productive efficiency, which amply 
compensates the possible disadvantages caused by restrictions in the choice of 
consumers, the block exemptions (compatible with Article 81(3) of the EU Treaty) 
provide a sector-specific regulatory framework for vehicle distribution and repair. The 
first BER was introduced in 1985 (Regulation 123/85). From then on and until a few 
years ago, some vertical distribution agreements included huge restrictions on retail 
competition. The main problem began when producers became free to combine 
selective and exclusive distribution systems. Under the combination of the two systems, 
on the one hand, manufacturers forbid authorized distributors (which are chosen on the 
basis of criteria such as the size and quality of the showroom and the quality of the 
personnel) to sell to non-authorized distributors. On the other hand, these distributors 
are only allowed to be allocated within certain sales territories.  
At the end of the 90s, the European Commission became greatly concerned 
about the possibility that many car price differentials observed across the European 
countries were caused by the lack of competition among retailers. As the Commission 
indicated in a press release (IP/00/1306): “consumers in particular do not seem to derive 
from this distribution system the fair share of the benefits of the creation of a European 
Single Market in 1993”. At the beginning of 2000, in view of this situation, the 
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti said that a deep reform of the regime for car 
distribution was needed in order to "put the consumer in the driver's seat". Taking into 
account data from earlier studies by independent consultants (i.e. Degryse and 
Verboven, 2000) and from agents’ experience with the BER of 1995 (1475/95), the 
Commission's evaluation report established that the producer had too much control over 
the dealer’s business. Specifically, it indicated that the combination of the two 
distribution systems was the main negative restriction hindering competition between 
dealers. 
A thorough reform of the legal framework within the sector began in 2002 with 
the approval of the BER (1400/2002). This regulation introduced a number of 
substantial changes as regards agreements on the distribution of new vehicles. In short, 
it offered consumers more chances to choose where to have their cars repaired and 
serviced, and encouraged the development of innovative distribution methods such as 
internet sales and the existence of multi-brand dealerships. Moreover, the aim of the 
changes was to achieve greater price competition between dealers and to make cross-
  8border purchases easier. To achieve these last two objectives, the main measures 
became fully applicable after a transition period. Since November 2003 carmakers have 
had to choose between a selective and an exclusive distribution system in order to be 
exempted from Article 81(3) of the EU Treaty. However, in practice, until a few years 
ago car distribution continued to be tightly controlled by the manufacturers, who 
imposed strong limitations both to increase the intensity of competition in each of the 
areas and to diminish the possible regional differences in choices made by consumers. 
This is because contracts continued to include “location clauses”, which forbade dealers 
in a selective distribution system from setting up additional outlets anywhere in the EU. 
According to the Commission (press release IP/02/1073), these clauses continued to 
allow a near-identical reproduction of the motor vehicle distribution system that 
combined both selectivity and territorial protection. 
As of October 2005 car manufacturers can no longer stop their authorized 
dealers from opening sales and delivery outlets wherever they choose within the EU. 
Dealers can thus operate outside their own countries and are free to set up outlets 
wherever a business opportunity presents itself. It is broadly recognized that abolition of 
the “location clause” was the most proactive reforming aspect within the new regulation 
to fight against carmakers holding onto their control.
6 It is therefore possible that this 
measure has significantly reduced cross-border segmentation in motor vehicles. 
At the time of writing this paper, the European Commission is carrying out a 
review of the market situation and has called for comments from interested parties 
(launched in 2007). This is because the BER (1400/2002) will expire in May 2010 and, 
therefore, it is necessary to advance in basic orientations for the regime of the future 
competition law. Following the most recent press release on the issue (IP/09/1168), the 
Commission points out that it “has not found indications of significant competition 
shortcomings in the EU primary market (sales of new vehicles) but rather structural 
overcapacity and falling real prices. The future competition law framework in this 
sector should therefore not impose regulatory constraints which might increase 
distribution costs and are not justified by the objective of protecting competition on the 
market”. In view of this situation, the Commission has announced that its intention is to 
extend the current regulation in order to provide a smooth transitory period of three 
years after May 2010. It is obvious that in-depth information about the impact of 
specific measures is needed to better orientate the after-period. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
6 Therefore, it is not surprising that the European Council for Motor Trades and Repairs has vigorously 
opposed the prohibition of the clause after a transitory period following the passing of the law. 
  9Commission has already communicated some general proposals. It proposes the 
alignment of the sectoral rules by applying the general competition rules on vertical 
agreements, although it also recognizes that it is necessary “to introduce safeguards in 
the form of guidelines against any possible closing off of new entrants, price discipline 
imposed by manufacturers or market segmentation through territorial protection or 
impediments to cross-border sales”. Ultimately, the purpose of the Commission is to 
ensure there is at least as much competition in these areas as there was under the BER 
(1400/2002). 
3.   The empirical model 
To illustrate the specification used here, we suppose the example of a profit-
maximizing firm that is selling in international markets, i=1,...N, which share a 
common currency. The set of first-order conditions for the exporter’s profits in domestic 
currency could be expressed (in logs) for each period t=1,...T as a destination-specific 
markup: 
    () )
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where pit represents the (fob) price of a product for each export destination market in 
terms of the exporter’s currency, ct is the common marginal cost which depends on 
exchange rate variations via the imported input prices (w), and the total amount 







it η  represents the specific price 
elasticity of the demand schedule perceived by the exporter for each foreign market i, 
which also depends on exchange rate variations between the exporter’s currency and the 
common currency shared by the destination markets. In this context, only cross-
differences between perceived elasticities can generate idiosyncratic markup 
adjustments (which implies an active strategy of third-degree price discrimination).
7 To 
measure the induced markup adjustments we begin by defining et as the exchange rate 
of the exporter's currency per unit of the buyer's currency. In line with Knetter (1989), 
from equation (1), we can obtain: 
 
                                                 
7 In a general framework, we can consider perceived elasticities as corresponding to residual demand 
curves (see, for example, Knetter (1989)). 
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where λi captures the specific constant-markup for each destination market, and βi is the 
idiosyncratic effect of exchange rate variations on the optimal export prices. Lastly, uit 
are the regression disturbance terms.  
Since we are interested in knowing whether there are divergences in perceived 
elasticities, we are concerned with the departure pricing strategy with respect to the 
average for the export destination markets. Let us therefore also consider empirical 
model (2) as a set of deviations from the respective mean of N observations (in which 
the unobservable marginal cost is no longer present): 
   ) ( ln ) ( ) ( ln ln . . . . t it t i i t it u u e p p − + − + − = − β β λ λ          (3) 
where the destination effect  ) ( . λ λ − i  controls for permanent differences between the 
specific markups and the average for the group of destination markets. The 
interpretation of the coefficients  ) ( . β β − i  is straightforward. These coefficients reveal 
information about differences in the degree of PTM behavior with respect to the mean 
of the export destination markets. Thus, a non-zero coefficient would indicate the 
existence of market segmentation and different convexity of the demand schedule with 
respect to the mean of the destination markets. Alternatively, a zero value would be 
because there is no particular markup adjustment for market i. This would reveal the 
same perception of changes in the elasticities in market i and the mean for the group of 
markets. In the case of  ) ( . β β − i =0 ∀i this should be interpreted as similarity across the 
overall perceived market structures. Obviously, this special situation can be obtained by 
eliminating the barriers, which facilitates market segmentation. 
Moreover, we can establish a link between the sign of the coefficients in (3) and 
the relative convexities of perceived demand. This is because, according to Marston 
(1990), the optimal destination-specific markup that is charged will fall (increase) if, 
when the exporter’s currency appreciates (depreciates) against the buyer’s, the 
perceived elasticity of residual demand become more (less) elastic. This is the case of a 
demand schedule that is less convex than a constant elasticity demand (like a linear 
demand). Hence, a demand schedule that is less (more) convex for market i than the 
average of the group of markets would imply a positive (negative) value for  ) ( . β β − i . 
 
  114.   Dataset 
We use a dataset referring to monthly exports from the UK for a sample period 
from January 1999 to January 2009 (henceforth, 1999m1-2009m1). We divide the 
analysis on pricing behavior into two types of automobile products (following the most 
detailed level of Combined Nomenclature sub-positions, that is, 8-digit classification 
level): gasoline-powered spark-ignition engines (87032319) and diesel-powered 
automobiles (87033219). From now on, we will refer to these types of automobiles as 
simply gasoline and diesel cars. We also consider non-automotive goods with the aim of 
controlling for a possible effect exerted by the creation of the euro area and other 
general European policies. In particular, we also take into account two popular products 
exported by the UK: malt Scotch whisky (22083032) and blended Scotch whisky 
(22083052). Together with gasoline and diesel cars, these whisky products are 
important UK exports. Thus, on the one hand, gasoline and diesel cars ranked first and 
second, respectively, on the list of UK vehicle exports to the EU over the period under 
consideration (out of a total of 279 products included in chapter 87). On the other hand, 
malt Scotch whisky and blended Scotch whisky also came first and second, 
respectively, on the list of UK beverages exported to the EU over the period under study 
(out of a total of 262 products included in chapter 22). 
 
Table 1: Percentage of exports by destination country 








































































































































































Germany  30.2 25.9 24.3 27.2 18.6 20.5 22.1 20.8 12.5 16.0 21.8 
Belgium-Lux.  7.2  9.5  13.7 13.7 20.6 22.2 23.1 22.8 27.8 22.8 18.3 
Italy  15.4 16.9 16.0 14.8 16.3 12.5 11.3  9.8  10.6 10.4 13.4 
Spain  10.9 11.0 13.0  9.7  9.8  13.8 13.8 12.4 12.2 11.7 11.8 








Total of group  74.2 73.1 76.6 76.6 76.9 81.1 80.4 73.0 69.8 69.4 75.1 
               
Spain  20.8 18.5 20.1 16.3 16.3 23.1 26.4 23.4 21.5 18.7 20.5 
Belgium-Lux.  7.0  7.0  8.2  8.8  16.4 16.8 29.2 40.3 34.2 34.9 20.3 
Italy  21.7 19.3 17.5 23.1 19.6 18.2 17.3 17.8 20.8 18.1 19.3 
France  21.1 21.8 22.3 24.3 24.0 20.5 14.3  7.9  7.5  9.6  17.3 









  Total of group  82.4 77.5 83.3 84.8 86.9 90.5 92.5 93.9 90.2 87.7 87.0 
        Elaborated from the COMEXT database. 
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Moreover, the analysis also considers the most important car export destination 
countries belonging to the euro area (which also coincide with most important 
destination countries in the EU). Specifically, we take into account the export flows to 
Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In Table 1 we report the 
percentage of UK exports for the destination countries under consideration in 
comparison to the total value of automobile product exports to the euro area-11. As we 
can see, the destination countries considered here represent an important share of the 
exports. Over a ten-year period, this group of countries accounted for an average of 
75.1% of the total exports to the euro area-11 for the case of gasoline cars and 87% for 
diesel cars. Furthermore, for whisky products we also consider the most important 
destination countries in the euro area-11 which coincide with the automobile 
destinations. Specifically, we will refer to exports to Spain, France, Germany and Italy. 
Over the ten-year period that was studied, this group of countries represents 83.7% of 
the total exports to the euro area-11 for the case of blended whisky and 87.1% for malt 
whisky. Since whisky products are also regularly exported to the Netherlands and 
Portugal we will include these countries in a complementary regression analysis. 
The prices corresponding to the automotive and the non-automotive products are 
approximated by unit value indices calculated using data collected from the open 
official Eurostat database for European exports (COMEXT).
8 Furthermore, from the 
Eurostat New Cronos database, we also collect monthly data on bilateral exchange rates 
between the UK’s currency (pound sterling) and the currency of the export destination 
countries (euro). As we can see in Figure 1, there are clear variations in the exchange 
rates over time (and which are quite large at the end of the sample period). This fact will 





                                                 
8 The use of unit values is commonplace in the empirical literature on PTM. It is important to know that, 
although some differences in quality could exist among the destination countries, this should not 
represent a significant problem for our purpose. Even when the price data that are used are not 
sufficiently detailed to ensure that product qualities are identical for all export destinations, the model 
may reveal the presence of market segmentation by price discrimination in the sense meant by Stigler (see 
Goldberg and Knetter (1997)). 
  13Figure 1: Monthly exchange rates (Pounds Sterling/Euro) 
 
 
   Source:  Eurostat New Cronos database. 
 
5.   Commentary and analysis of results 
5.1. Cross-country PTM estimations 
We begin the empirical analysis by estimating equation (3) taking into account 
data from 1999m1 to 2009m1. In Table 2 we report the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimated coefficients associated with differences in PTM behavior, the cross-sectional 
test and the stability test related with each class of automobiles. As can been seen, 
several of the coefficients are statistically different from zero for both types of 
automobiles. These results reveal that markets still remained sufficiently segmented for 
firms to obtain more profits from differences in the market structures. Particularly, in 
the case of gasoline cars, we can reject zero coefficients for Belgium-Luxembourg and 
Spain (at the 5  per cent level of significance). While the estimated coefficients for 
Belgium-Luxembourg indicate that the markup adjustments induced by exchange rate 
variations are bigger than for the average of the group of countries, adjustments for 
Spain are clearly smaller. In the case of diesel cars, results suggest that the markup 
adjustments are also bigger for Belgium-Luxembourg and France, while they are 
smaller for Germany and Italy with respect to the average of the group of countries. As 
we have seen in section 3, these results could be interpreted in terms of convexity of 
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demand perceived by exporters. Thus, the estimates indicate that convexity is lower 
(than the average for the group of destination countries) in the case of Belgium-
Luxembourg and France, while it is bigger for Germany and Italy. Furthermore, we also 
test for cross-country differences in PTM behavior (by considering cross-restrictions of 
a SUR equation system)
9. Results of the Wald statistic allow us to confirm that, in 
general, PTM behavior and convexity of perceived demand are critically dependent on 
the export destination country. That is, differences in markup adjustments take place 
across destination countries and therefore the existence of market segmentation and 
heterogeneity in the market structures is not just an isolated fact.  
Nevertheless, the cross-country PTM deviations could be unstable over time. In 
order to test this hypothesis, we apply the procedure methodology recently proposed by 
Elliot and Müller (EM), where the null hypothesis is a stable linear model within the 
context of an unknown break process. Hence, no arbitrary trimming of the sample data 
is required. With this methodology we efficiently test the stable regression model 
represented by (3) against an alternative model in which exchange rate coefficients 
depend on time (that is,  t i .) ( β β −
                                                
). From the empirical results we can infer that 
differences in PTM are, in general, unstable. Except for Germany, in the case of diesel 
cars, we can reject constancy of individual coefficients (at the 5  per cent level of 
significance). This outcome indicates the presence of significant changes in cross-
country PTM deviations over time. Obviously this is compatible with a process of 
convergence (or divergence) in the PTM behavior across countries and, ultimately, with 
a tendency toward more (or less) similarity across the market structures perceived by 
UK exporters. 
In Table 2 we also present the estimated coefficients for two separate sub-
periods. We refer to results obtained from data before and after the complete 
implementation of distribution rules under the BER (1400/2002). Results for the first 
sub-period (1999m1-2005m9) show that most of the estimated coefficients are also 
significant at the standard levels. Once again, these estimations show that markup 
adjustments for Belgium-Luxembourg are clearly bigger than the average for the group 
of countries for both types of cars. The results support the hypothesis that the opposite 
phenomenon takes place in the exports destined for France and Germany in the case of 
gasoline cars and for Italy as far as diesel car exports are concerned. Differences in
 
9 Model (3) can be efficiently estimated as a set of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) or, since the 
explanatory variable coincides for N equations, alternatively it can be estimated as independent 
regressions.   Gasoline  
Automobiles
 Diesel   
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  21.50*** 
 
 coefficients across the group of European countries are also confirmed, for both sorts of 
vehicles, by means of the Wald test. Furthermore, from the EM test, we can also infer 
that coefficients are unstable in this first sub-period.  
With regard to the second sub-period considered (2005m10-2009m1), we only 
find that the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero (at the standard 
levels) for some destination countries of gasoline cars. More particularly, the degree of 
PTM behavior is bigger with respect to the group average in Germany and it is lower 
for Italy and Spain. Surprisingly, for diesel automobiles, no coefficients are statistically 
significant in the five destination countries. These results are reinforced by the Wald 
test. While we can reject equality of coefficients across destination countries for 
gasoline cars, we cannot reject the fact that coefficients are equal to zero for diesel cars. 
Hence, in this last category of exported products, there is no evidence in favor of market 
segmentation and divergences in market structures. A possible explanation for this 
result is that diesel car markets are already highly integrated. Nevertheless, because 
several individual coefficients are seen to be unstable, it cannot be claimed that car 
markets are already highly integrated within the whole of the sub-period. Variations in 
coefficients are compatible with a gradual convergence in pricing strategies over the 
sub-period, which would reveal the success of the changes in the competition regime. 
5.2.  Moving window regressions 
In order to study the evolution of the differences in cross-country PTM behavior, 
we carry out moving window regressions from equation (3). Our estimations start in 
1999m1, iterating forward month by month until 2009m1. This will allow us to create a 
continuous picture of the evolution of differences in PTM across the five destination 
countries. Since, at each new iteration, the methodological procedure adds observations 
and excludes the older point of time, a sample window-size should be defined. We 
begin by choosing 82 monthly observations as our central window-size for regressions. 
In this way, the first sample period concludes in a time in which new rules for 
distribution under the BER entered fully into force (in 2005m10). Thus, since the 
consecutive moving window regressions will include a new time observation from this 
date, the evolution of estimations will provide the dynamics of car market integration. 
As a complement, we also carry out moving window regressions adding and removing 
12 monthly observations from this window-size. Obviously the results of the 
estimations through a bigger window-size (92 observations) are also interesting because 
they provide the evolution in a longer-term perspective, while estimations through a 
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smaller window-size (70 observations) capture the possible short-term changes in a 
better way.  
The panels shown in the left and center of Figure 2 illustrate, by different sample 
window-sizes, the evolution of the coefficients for both classes of cars. In general, we 
find a considerable degree of similarity in the evolution between the estimated 
coefficients for the same destination countries. For example, when a window-size for a 
sample of 82 observations is considered, the Pearson correlation between estimations 
for gasoline and diesel cars is 0.76 in the case of Belgium-Luxembourg, and 0.66 in the 
case of Germany. This relationship can be due to the fact that variations in the number 
of dealers for both types of car engines usually coincide. The possible divergences in 
pricing behavior for the same country should therefore be attributed fundamentally to 
differences in the evolution of consumer preferences for each sort of product. This is the 
case of Italy, where graphs for both types of products reflect a clear asymmetry between 
the dynamics of pricing behavior for gasoline and diesel cars. 
The three panels on the right in Figure 2 summarize the evolution of cross-
country divergences in PTM behavior. As we can see, there is a strong relationship for 
both sorts of automotive products in the estimated evolution of cross-sectional 
dispersion in PTM. Specifically, the values of the coefficient correlation are 0.96, 0.82 
and 0.65 for window-sizes of 94, 82 and 70 monthly observations, respectively. 
The shapes of the graphs for both types of cars seem compatible with the 
hypothesis of convergence in PTM behavior across countries. This is quite notable, at 
least in the last part of the sample, for diesel cars. In particular, for this type of cars, the 
graph related to lower window-sizes (70 observations) suggests that convergence has 
taken place rapidly in the most recent period. In this same period, cross-sectional 
dispersion in PTM seems to be practically zero. This interesting result is consistent with 
a high degree of similarity in market structures and is in line with the outcome obtained 
for the last sub-period (presented above in Table 2).  
The panels obtained from the window-sizes related with 82 and 70 observations 
show that cross-sectional dispersion of the estimated coefficients increases slightly 
when we take into account data from 2008 in the case of gasoline cars. This specific 
result is in agreement with descriptive data from the latest car reports published by the 
European Commission, where the increase in observed price dispersion is attributed to 
the impact produced by the global economic crisis. In this context, shocks in demand 
(arising from, for example, blows to consumer confidence) can affect the relative 
market structures of European countries in different ways.19
Figure 2: Evolution of estimations of Pricing-to-Market differences with respect to the average of the group of countries 
Gasoline  automobiles      Diesel  automobiles       Cross-sectional dispersion  




 Table 3: Cross-sectional test 
 
First sample period  
Last sample period  












1999m1-2005m10   71.56***  22.73*** 









The asterisks *** and ** indicate that the null hypothesis of equality of country coefficients is rejected at 
the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. The Wald statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with 
5 degrees of freedom. Regressions were performed with Stata 10.  
 
Lastly, as complementary information, we additionally provide results from tests 
for cross-sectional differences in PTM in the first and last sample period of the moving 
window regressions that were performed (represented in the graphs in Figure 2). As we 
can see in Table 3, results for the case of gasoline automobiles support the presence of a 
very significant dispersion in PTM behavior across countries for both sample periods, 
regardless of the window-size that is considered. In the case of diesel automobiles, a 
significant dispersion is also obtained except when we test coefficients obtained from 
the regression where the most recent sample period is used (2003m4-2009m1). This last 
result, which is compatible with the one obtained for the second sub-period analyzed in 
Table 2 (2005m10-2009m1), may be due to the fact that these markets are already 
highly integrated. Nevertheless, in order to ascertain whether changes in competition 
rules have made a contribution to any extraordinary extent, we will conduct a formal 
analysis of cross-sectional convergence. 
5.3. Analysis of convergence 
With the aim of examining whether cross-country dispersion of PTM falls over 
time once the changes in the car distribution rules in European countries have been 
completed, we take up the concept of σ−convergence suggested by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992). A fundamental advantage of applying this concept is that it would also 
directly imply the presence of β−convergence. However, the fulfillment of convergence 
according to this last approach does not necessarily imply σ−convergence as we can 
see, for example, in Young et al. (2008). Let us now express the σ−convergence 
regression as an estimated dependent variable (EDV)
 model:
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      01 ˆ t t σ ααε = ++                         (4) 
where  σ ˆ
t
 is the estimated cross-sectional dispersion of PTM behavior, t is the time 
variable and ε  is the regression disturbance term. Since the dependent variable is based 
on estimated coefficients,
 
t ε  includes a sample error which is a heteroskedastic 
component (because there is a difference between
 the true value of the cross-sectional 
dispersion and its estimated value). As usual in the EDV
 model, we apply OLS with 
White's consistent standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. Obviously, in this 
model the presence of σ−convergence would imply that parameter  1 α  will be negative.  
As our dependent variable we consider the estimated coefficients obtained from 
moving window regressions with a fixed window-size of 94 and 82 monthly 
observations. Thus, in both cases, the evolution of the cross-sectional dispersion (of the 
estimated coefficients) indicates the effect generated by the sequential inclusion in the 
regression of a new monthly observation after 2005m10 (while the oldest observation in 
the previous sample data is removed). By proceeding in this way the period free of 
“location clauses” will have an increasingly greater relative weight. In Table 4, we 
present some results concerning the estimations of σ−convergence in EU car market 
structures. In the first column of this table we indicate, for a given window-size, the 
start and the end sample period used to estimate the dependent variable in the 
regression. When the EDV is obtained from previous moving window regressions 
which sequentially incorporate new time observations from 2005m10 (window-size of 
94 and 82 observations), the results are clearly in favor of convergence over time. This 
is so for both sorts of automobiles (at 5% significance level).  
Additionally, a pooled data regression for both automobile categories is also 
presented (where a fixed-effects estimator is used and standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering in each type of cars). This excludes possible convergence in PTM caused by 
particular aspects that affect diesel or gasoline cars in a specific way. The pooled 
convergence regressions could be more precise to capture the common effect of car 
distribution rules because they represent the common evolution in cross-country PTM 
differences for both types of cars. Independently of the selected window-size, results 
clearly support convergence. Nevertheless, since it is possible that common evolution is 
caused by a general policy in the countries under consideration (like the effects derived 
from monetary union), we also conduct a control analysis. 22
 
Table 4: EDV convergence regressions 
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Robust standard errors are between parentheses. The estimates that are statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels are marked 
with ***, ** and *, respectively. In the same way, these asterisks also indicate that the null hypothesis for equal country coefficients is rejected at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance levels, respectively. The Wald test statistic follows a Chi-square distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. A fixed effects estimator is used for the pooled 
data where standard errors are adjusted for clustering in each class of products. Considered destination countries: [a] Spain, France, Germany and Italy; [b]: Spain, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. Regressions were performed with Stata 10. 
 
 On the one hand, we use a control group of non-automotive products which are 
subject to the general policy framework in the euro area countries but not to the specific 
policy for cars. Our control products are blended whisky and malt whisky which, 
together with the diesel and gasoline automobiles, constitute some of the most important 
products regularly exported by the UK to most of the countries considered in this study. 
In the last six columns of Table 4 we can see the results for the two types of whisky 
(and the different number of destination countries). While the estimated coefficients for 
blended whisky converge, in the case of malt whisky we obtain a contrary outcome. 
Moreover, the pooled estimation for both whisky products supports the claim that there 
is no common factor that reinforces a convergence process.  
On the other hand, we divide the sample into a control period (with restrictive 
rules for car distribution) and a period from 2005m10 (with complete liberalization for 
distribution under the current BER). A convergence analysis by EDV is performed from 
the estimated coefficients obtained from moving window regressions with a smaller 
window-size (58 monthly observations). The results differ for each sample period. Prior 
to full liberalization of the distribution system, there is no significant evidence of 
convergence for gasoline cars, while evidence of divergence does exist for the case of 
diesel automobiles. In contrast, a significant convergence is obtained for the period in 
which the new rules for car distribution had been fully adopted (for both gasoline and 
diesel cars). Furthermore, the results of regressions with pooled data for both 
automotive products contrast significantly between the older and the modern period. 
While for the first period there is evidence of divergence in cross-country PTM, in the 
second period convergence is clear. Hence, empirical results support the hypothesis that 
there is a common factor that reinforces the convergence process. 
6.   Concluding remarks 
In the present paper we use export prices (net of tax and transport costs) to study 
the market integration process in the European automobile sector by analyzing PTM 
behavior. The paper is based on the idea that as market integration for a particular 
product improves, then differences in PTM behavior across export destinations become 
smaller. From this operational idea we follow an empirical procedure with the intention 
of obtaining a picture of the evolution of European market integration for cars. More 
specifically, our investigation is focused on evaluating the success of full liberalization 
of car distribution under the BER (1400/2002). We examine whether further cross-
border market integration in the EU has really been promoted by the specific reform of 
  23competition rules for car sales, which entered into force in October 2005 after the 
abolition of the well-known “location clauses”. With this purpose in mind, we used a 
dataset corresponding to gasoline and diesel automobile exports from the UK 
throughout the period from 1999m1 to 2009m1. 
Our preliminary results revealed that, in general, PTM behavior is critically 
dependent on export destination markets for both sorts of cars. This phenomenon 
implies a significant segmentation of markets and dissimilarity between their structures. 
The outcome is in line with previous research which also obtains differences in induced 
markup adjustments for the automobile industry in different contexts and study periods 
(i.e. Gagnon and Knetter (1995), Gil-Pareja (2003), Balaguer et al. (2004), and Balaguer 
(2007)). Nevertheless, from the methodology recently proposed by Elliot and Muller 
(2006), we found that cross-country PTM deviations are significantly unstable 
throughout the period that was analyzed. To determine whether the absence of stability 
can be attributed to an evolution toward integration of market structures after the 
completion of changes for distribution, we conducted a deeper analysis based on 
estimations of moving window regressions. 
Moving estimations (with different window-sizes for the sample period) were 
represented with the aim of providing a comprehensive picture of the evolution in cross-
country PTM differences. We found that evolution of cross-sectional dispersion for 
estimations is quite similar for both types of automobiles throughout the whole of the 
period under consideration. This is obviously compatible with the existence of common 
rules for distribution of automotive products.  
The estimated PTM differences are used at a later stage to implement a formal 
analysis of convergence across countries based on the demanding  criterion  of 
σ−convergence. This analysis was applied to the period in which the euro had been 
introduced but “location clauses” were still included in contracts, and for the period 
where all the distribution rules under BER (1400/2002) had been fully adopted. We 
found that cross-country PTM differences are significantly reduced for both types of 
cars when only data from October 2005 is considered. This result contrasts sharply with 
the absence of convergence when data for the previous period is used. Moreover, we 
conducted a control analysis by applying the σ−convergence  approach for an additional 
pair of closely related products. As in the case of the analysis of the older period for 
cars, the purpose was to obtain possible general effects deriving from the introduction 
of the euro. A lack of PTM convergence across countries was also obtained for the pair 
of control products. 
  24We think that the evidence obtained in favor of convergence in PTM behavior 
across European countries after October 2005 should be attributed fundamentally to the 
reduction of “real barriers” produced within the context of changes in the rules for 
distribution. One important reason that can be concluded in this sense is that, in the 
context under analysis, variations in PTM differences over time cannot be attributed to 
the presence of a sticky-consumer-price effect originated by fluctuations in exchange 
rates across destination countries. As Engel and Rogers (2001) indicate, in a situation 
where price convergence arises from a reduction of “real barriers”, the welfare of the 
region is clearly improved. 
In sum, the present paper clearly supports the hypothesis that complete 
liberalization of the distribution system in accordance with the BER (1400/2002) has 
had a significant impact on the integration of European car markets. From this outcome 
and previous empirical research in this area, we can conclude that although currency 
unions can play, in general, an important role in promoting goods market integration in 
the long run (i.e. Parsley (2001), Engel and Rose (2002)), in some conditions it might 
not be sufficient. Therefore, complementary sectoral measures conducive to removing 
location restrictions can be of great help to increase integration of markets. Our findings 
agree with the predictions made by Goldberg and Verboven (2001) from their study 
focused on the European car market when they indicated that, in spite of the benefits of 
the European Monetary Union, “…without further measures to increase European 
integration, it will not completely eliminate existing cross-country price differences”. 
Fortunately, in recent years the European Commission has been implementing 
additional measures such as the abolition of “location clauses”, which seem to have 
increased the integration of markets considerably. We hope that our findings will 
contribute by suggesting what type of regulations may successfully promote market 
integration. 
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